Useful site is about custom coursework writing help

Separability thesis definition in writing

Feb 28, 2018

The Relevance Of Legal Positivism

Published: 23rd March, 2015 12th May, 2017

Disclaimer: This essay has been submitted by a student. This is not an example of the work written by our professional essay writers.

Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of UK Essays.

I have chosen to critically examine The Contemporary Relevance of Legal Positivism by Professor Brian Z Tamanaha who has written on the topic of legal positivism, and this is a legal theory that greatly interests me. Though the title suggests otherwise, in his article Tamanaha argues a particular point that in its current state legal positivism fails to engage with "real world matters".   Tamanaha goes on to suggest that legal positivism has been "emasculated"   to the point where it is no longer a relevant legal theory, as modern discussions on legal positivism have drastically shifted away from the original ideas of legal positivism proposed by Bentham and Austin. However, to make such claims effectively requires compelling evidence, and this is something that the article plainly lacks. Moreover, Tamanaha's article is full of presumptions, which one can only assume that he has misinterpreted many of the theoretical debates between key characters within legal positivism. As a result, this dissertation will argue that although Tamanaha makes some important points, overall there are too many inaccuracies within the article, which make it weak and unpersuasive.

There are three particular arguments that will be pursued in this dissertation. Firstly, it will be argued that Legal Positivism does in fact deal with real world matters. Secondly, that the separation thesis supported by Hart is in fact false and Tamanaha may have misunderstood his work. Thirdly, it will be argued that Tamanaha's alternative is not the way to move forward; in fact we should move in a completely different direction and focus more on science rather than descriptive theory.

Legal Positivism and Real World Matters

To begin with, we need to clarify that Tamanaha's article is not without value, as Tamanaha has made some valid arguments, which cannot be disputed. Throughout his article, Tamanaha gives us a good account of what traditional legal positivism stood for and how contemporary legal theorists have transformed this important legal theory. As a result, it is only necessary to give a brief account of the historical background of legal positivism at a later stage in the dissertation.

For now, we will turn our attention to the issues within the article, the most problematic claim in the Tamanaha article is one where he states that legal positivists have divided into two different groups whereby both argue about legal theories and "turn their backs on real world matters".   This is something that I strongly disagree with and will be spending a large section of the essay arguing against this point. Apologies are made in advance, as it may seem to the reader that we are going off on a tangent but it will become clear at the end of this section that Tamanaha has made a critical mistake in making this claim. My line of argument will be to look at Brian Lieter's writings in "Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered" and dispute Tamanaha's statement through the link between American Legal Realism and Legal Positivism. Leiter argues at the outset the there are two common misconceptions within jurisprudence that he wants to rebuff. Firstly, that Legal Positivism and Legal Realism are not incompatible from a conceptual level. Secondly, that Legal Realism has been gravely misunderstood even by the central character of modern legal positivism, Hart.   

It seems in Leiter's view that only by comparing Legal Realism to Legal Positivism on a conceptual level can Hart argue that they are opposed to one another. He adds on that "Positivism is essentially a theory of law-a theory, in part, about what is distinctive of any society's legal norms--Realism is essentially a descriptive theory of adjudication, a theory about what it is judges really do when they decide cases."   In order for Legal Realism to work it must presuppose a theory of law and this is where according to Leiter Legal Positivism comes in.   Leiter admits that Legal Realism cannot ascertain to be a theory of law on a conceptual level because quite frankly is it a "philosophical mess" but he suggests that there are links between Legal Positivism and Legal Realism on an Empirical level. The empirical level will consider "whether or not legal rules causally determine judicial decisions." Leiter goes on to add that even though Hart was aware of this possibility he has not given a convincing argument to dispute the link at the empirical level.   One has to wonder why Hart stayed clear of such debates, was there something he was afraid of discovering.

Leiter is insistent that anyone writing on Legal Realism should fully understand what it stood for before attempting to define what it is or what it does. He adds on that many of the main characters within Legal Realism like Llewellyn, Frank, Radin, Moore, Yntema, Cohen, Oliphant, Green, and Hutcheson wanted to achieve the goal of "understanding judicial decision-making and, in particular, shared certain substantive views about how adjudication really works."   Leiter presses the argument that Legal Realism is a descriptive theory about how judges actually decide cases based on the facts of the cases instead of looking at legal rules. Although, it does seem clear that judges can predict cases if they fall within distinct patterns. This process allows judges and lawyers to predict the outcome of a case where the facts fall within a "situation type" which the outcome of that type has already been determined.   Oliphant clarifies this point when referring to commercial law and dealings between parties and the fact that judges may rely on "commercial norms"   (i.e. what would reasonably be expected of both parties in this situation) in order to decide a case.

Therefore, it seems that Realists wanted to identify and describe the way in which decisions are made by judges.   This is very similar to the way in which conceptual analysis works, which demonstrates that there is some sort of link between Legal Realism and Legal Positivism. Legal Realists wanted to push forward the idea of an "empirical theory of adjudication" as it gave us the best opportunity to fully understand judicial decisions.   Of course, such a theory would only work if Realists were able to 'presuppose' an existing theory of the concept of law.   

Leiter, like many others before him makes it clear that Legal Positivism is a "theory of law or about the nature of law".   What this tells us is that we must use this theory as a way of understanding and analysing our "concept" of law. This is a task which involves establishing the "criteria of legality"   and determining whether a certain norm is a legal norm. Leiter then covers the two most important theses of the Positivists' theory. The social thesis (which concludes it is society which decides what will count as law, "social fact") and the separation thesis (which states that what the "law is and what it ought to be are separate questions").   If Leiter's work is read carefully, it will become clear where Hart went wrong in his analysis and the fact that Hart offers no conclusive arguments to rebut the connections between Legal Positivism and Legal Realism. So if Hart misunderstood Legal Realism himself it is inevitable that those who read Hart and interpret his work will be making the same mistakes.

There are two clear arguments as to why Legal Realism and Legal Positivism are connected. Firstly, both Legal Realists and Legal Positivists accept that law is indeterminate. According to Leiter, Realists argue that trying to determine if a law is justified, based on "legal rules" has not worked in the past and that is not something that Realists want to do.   Therefore, Realists only wanted to find out what it is that makes judges decide cases in this way. Similarly, Hart accepted that legal rules are indeterminate because "there is a limit, inherent in the nature of language, to the guidance which general language can provide".   This was because language is, in Hart's opinion, "open-textured":

"There will indeed be plain cases constantly recurring in similar contexts to which general expressions are clearly applicable ("If anything is a vehicle a motor-car is one") but there will also be cases where it is not clear whether they apply or not. ("Does 'vehicle' used here include bicycles, airplanes, roller skates?"). The latter are fact-situations, continually thrown up by nature or human invention, which possess only some of the features of the plain cases but others which they lack."   

This then makes it clear that even the most celebrated 21st century legal positivist is aware that there are similar features between Legal Positivism and Legal Realism. The second argument is that both Positivists and Realist agree that legal rules do not determine decisions in some cases.   Realists for example argue that it will be up to judges to decide how the use a range of tools available to them when interpreting previous decisions. As Llewellyn puts it judges have the discretion to interpret a case "strictly" or "loosely" and that in most cases their interpretation will be "recognised, legitimate, honorable".   It is through adjudication that private parties, such as individuals or corporations are able to sort out legal disputes. In addition, adjudication is there to review any disagreements between private parties and public officials. If then judges are involved in the legal process whereby they have to assess evidence and arguments presented to them about legal issues surely this is something which can be considered 'a real world matter'. Tamanaha has failed to consider these sorts of arguments in his article and as a result has opened himself up to criticism.

Contrary to Tamanaha's argument, Legal Positivism does deal with real world matters, as adjudication is a real world matter. Legal Realism is about highlighting how law operates in practice, and Realists wanted to locate law in its broader context (not separate). Leiter also points out that Realists challenged the 'myth of legal certainty'- by highlighting indeterminacy of law. More importantly to our task here, it is clear that Legal Realism concerns law and study of law as an inherently practical activity associated with the "real world".   As a result, these findings suggest that Tamanaha was wrong to make such an erroneous claim without looking at the evidence to back up his premise. There are also a number of other faults with Tamanaha's article. In an attempt to convince the reader, Tamanaha has selected specific writings about legal positivism, which heavily criticise it in order to suit his side of argument, whilst ignoring arguments that are made in favour of legal positivism. He quotes Waldron who said that 'these analytical discussions tend to be flat and repetitive in consequence, revolving in smaller and smaller circles among a diminishing band of acolytes'   . What Waldron believes is that we should go back to traditional legal philosophy in order to improve our understanding of the concept of law. He states that in legal philosophy:

"there is less of a sense of a canon of great books stretching back to the dawn of time. If there is canonical work it is H.L.A Hart's book, The Concept of Law, which analytical jurists read over and over (and the squabble amongst themselves as to what it means and whose position is now closest to what Hart's is taken to be). Since Hart Developed his theory by criticizing the nineteenth-century jurisprudence of John Austin, there is also some half-hearted discussion on Austin's work. Beyond that however, the canon of legal philosophy is attenuated and non-existent."   

Of course, it is true that there hasn't been any standout publication on legal philosophy after Hart published The Concept of Law, but that does not mean that we should go back to the traditional ideologies on legal philosophy. Hart proved that some of the original ideas behind legal philosophy are unpractical in a modern society thus is it unproductive to keep applying them when trying to ascertain our concept of law. So common sense and reality would make us reject what Waldron suggests. Tamanaha then considers Twining, who has asserted that positivist debates are now 'repetitious, trivial, and almost entirely pointless'.   Twining comes across as a great admirer of Bentham whose work is highly valued, however, Twining believes that Bentham should not remain as a historical figure in legal philosophy. For Twining Bentham's "…version of legal positivism; a more flexible and subtle conception of sovereignty than Austin's; his penetrating attack on natural right; his progressive ideas on punishment; and his theory or adjudication"   remain important topics. In fact, Twining goes one step further to suggest that we should go beyond Bentham's work and look at the work of Augustine and Plato to help us understand issues we deal with today.   Whilst Bentham's work was crucial, it is important to remind ourselves that what he produced was suited for the 19th century, thus it seems unlikely that it will be beneficial in dealing with issues in a contemporary society. With regards to going beyond Bentham, it is impossible to conceive how ancient ideologies would help us deal with modern issue and therefore Twining's suggestion is on the verge of being absurd.

Tamanaha also refers to Schauer's work to argue that 'large numbers' of American law professors believe that 'analytical jurisprudence in general, and the debates about legal positivism in particular, are the largely irrelevant preoccupation of a small group of socially unaware but philosophical obsessed pedants'.   The simple explanation to this is that almost everyone involved in legal philosophy is a positivist.   Even Tamanaha accepts that legal positivism is the dominant legal theory of law, as the first paragraph of his article states that: "Most legal philosophers agree that legal positivism is the dominant theory of law today."   As a result, it is extremely difficult to argue on anything more than marginal issues as the main issues have already been agreed upon.

Therefore, until we have another philosopher like Dworkin or Hart who is able to come up with new and radical ideas, unfortunately, marginal arguments is all that is left for contemporary legal positivists to debate. Tamanaha has presented some inconsistent arguments in support of his position. Right at the outset, he admits that legal positivism is "by far the biggest camp within legal theory"   but at the same time attempts to argue that it is no longer relevant. It is simply irrational to describe a theory as being both dominant and irrelevant at the same time, Tamanaha has either set out his article to be extremely provocative, or he has not really planned his arguments.

Nonetheless, Tamanaha then moves on to explaining why legal positivism has reached this point of being irrelevant. One of his arguments is that "for much of its existence, the primary foil for legal positivism has been natural law theory. But natural law theory no longer has the primacy it once did."   Yet, Tamanaha then says that due to an agreement reached by natural law theorists and legal positivists on certain issues legal positivism has 'lost and important reason for being'.   It is astonishing how a professor who, according to Washington University in St Louis, is a "renowned jurisprudence scholar and author"   would make this sort of argument. Natural law theory might have hampered the complete domination of legal positivism but Tamanaha himself admits that natural law theory 'no longer has the primacy it once did'. How can a legal theory lose a reason for being if it is still the dominant theory after all this this time? In fact, Tamanaha is completely wrong as legal positivism is easily the best theory of law and there does not seem to be a theory out there that can match it.   Tamanaha seems to be confused as to what legal positivism stands for, namely that it seeks to provide a better understanding of the 'nature of law'   and if a new idea comes along positivists are willing to adopt it. Churchill once said, "I am an optimist- it does not seem to be much use being anything else."   It has become clear that Tamanaha's reasoning as to why legal positivism is in a problematic state is completely flawed as natural law only had a marginal effect on the dominance of legal positivism.

The most surprising error in Tamanaha's article is his attribution to Hart's success in the Concept of Law as on one of the reasons legal positivism has reached this point. Tamanaha writes that Hart "established the parameters of the current understanding of legal positivism". Tamanaha goes on to add that "legal positivism today remains trapped within Hart's paradigm."   Either Tamanaha has misunderstood Hart's writing or he has completely failed to grasp it. Hart made it clear in The Concept of Law that his interpretation of the concept of law is "quite 'open' in that it does not forbid the extension of the term."   Therefore, how can legal positivism be 'trapped in Hart's paradigm' if Hart himself has admitted that this is not a conclusive answer of what the concept of law is and that from time to time this term will need to be expanded in order to be applicable in a modern society. Tamanaha could at least afford Hart the courtesy of fully reading and understanding his work before making such erroneous presumptions, which do not portray Hart's objectives.

Yet, Tamanaha's misinterpretation of Hart's work does not stop there. One of his other arguments is that legal positivism through the separation thesis allows us to be in a better position to challenge evil law. Tamanaha relies on a quote from Hart who said that:

"So long as human beings can gain sufficient cooperation from some to enable them to dominate others, they will use the forms of law as one of their instruments. Wicked men will enact wicked rules which others will enforce. What surely is most needed in order to make men clear sighted in confronting the official abuse of power, is that they should preserve the sense that the certification of something as legally valid is not conclusive of the question of obedience, and that, however great the aura of majesty or authority which the official system may have, its demands must in the end be submitted to a moral scrutiny."   

According to Tamanaha, only if we separate the question of law and morality we can be in a position to judge whether a law is moral or not, Tamanaha writes that Hart is "Reminding everyone of the separation between law and morality, according to this view, should enable citizens and legal officials to recognize, resist, and disavow evil law."   To drive this point home Tamanaha also relies on Schauer's work,   but in a few pages within the same work Schauer concludes that the separation of law and morality does not necessary allow people to resist bad law.   To add further misery to Tamanaha's argument, Bix writes that there are no conclusive arguments "either logical or psychological, for favouring legal positivism or natural law theory (or any other alternative) for the resistance to evil law."   Again, Bix is another source Tamanaha has quoted in his article but somehow he has either misread his own sources or has chosen to simply construct them in a way which would better suit his argument. In summary, it has become clear that Tamanaha has presented a number of unfounded arguments, which can easily be rebutted. In fact, some of his arguments come across as unprofessional and it is surprising that that someone who is highly regarded in legal philosophy would see any value in presenting such arguments to the reader. Having discovered that Tamanaha's claim that legal positivism does not connect with real world matters is misguided, we will now move on to the second part of the dissertation, which will argue that contrary to Tamanaha's belief the separation thesis is in fact false.

Separation Thesis is False

One of the key arguments Tamanaha makes in the article is that the shift away from traditional legal positivism has had a wider affect to the point that one of the fundamental ideas behind it namely, the separation thesis, has been dramatically transformed to a point where it no longer resembles the original ideas.   Looking at legal philosophy from a historical context, it is clear that Bentham's contribution helped shape the way in which law is perceived today. As a result, it would be almost impossible to talk about legal positivism without mention his work. Classical legal positivism as portrayed by Bentham and Austin suggests that the notion of law is simply a command of the sovereign, which obliges subjects to obey the law and gives official authority to carry out punishment. Modern legal positivists adopt a considerably more sophisticated approach to the concept of law, but, like their distinguished predecessors,   they deny the relationship between law and morals.   

Bentham single-handedly sought to transform English common law in order to achieve a greater good in society.   Through his critical analysis of the common law Bentham made it possible to construct a comprehensive theory of law. Bentham wanted to unmask the true meaning of the common law and make all of the common law's misconceptions clearer.   In his opinion, the common law was so indeterminate, and in such chaos that it was close to being pervasive. His main argument was that in order to achieve clarity and certainty common law had to be written and recorded in a manner, which could be traced when a similar legal issue arises, thus allowing for them to be deal with in the same manner throughout England.   Bentham wanted to organise the common law in a way that it could control the behaviour of society as citizens would have a clearer idea of how they would be punished if they disobeyed the law.   In addition, by systematically setting these rules it meant judges had less power in making the law and it made it easier to understand your legal rights and obligations.

John Austin followed in the work of his predecessor as he advocated the idea of commands as notions of law. Austin was concerned about state power and which laws subjects had to obey. It can be argued that both Bentham and Austin wanted to achieve a greater understanding of the principal features of the law. However, it has been suggested that Austin's definition of law as commands is limited in its application only to criminal law.   In addition, other writers have observed that whilst Bentham was concerned about a single 'complete law' Austin wanted to create a science of law.   Austin also made it clear that what the law is and what it should be are two separate questions and they should always stay separate.   It is in no doubt that Bentham and Austin laid the foundations for modern legal positivism. However, their ideas have been considerably refined, developed, and even rejected, by contemporary legal positivists.

H.L.A. Hart is often credited with providing a more sophisticated account of legal positivism than provided in Bentham and Austin's writings. In doing so, Hart advises us that we must apply analytical, linguistic and philosophical techniques to the study of law in order to achieve a greater understand of the concept of law.   In The Concept of Law, Hart made this point clear from the outset in the preface that his task is about achieving a "descriptive sociology" [or in other words, hermeneutic description] thus a deeper meaning in the nature of words and law.   Hart considers legal concepts and the ideals we may have about the law and legal systems in a different point of view. He asks questions which had not been asked before, focusing specifically on the conceptual context of law. Whilst advocating some of the previous ideas about legal positivism, Hart strenuously denies that law should be seen as an imperative theory of law.   Hart's interpretation of positivism is completely different to the accounts given by Bentham and Austin. This may be because society has changed dramatically since their time; as a result, contemporary legal positivism focuses less attention on a coercive picture of law. Hart made it clear that the only way to understand the true nature of law is to look at actual social practices that apply within our own communities.   

Law, in Hart's analysis, is a system of rules, which our society constructs and transforms as time goes by. Legal rules are divisible into 'primary rules' and 'secondary rules'.   Primary rules prohibited committing certain acts which would have jeopardised the close coexistence in our community (e.g. theft, murder etc.). However, as a society becomes more complex, there is obviously a need to change these primary rules, hence why Hart advocates secondary rules. Unlike primary rules, secondary rules do not generally impose duties, but usually confer power to adjudicate on breaches of primary rules, and to identify which rules are actually obligation rules.   For Hart, there are "two minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence of a legal system". They are that:

"those rules of behaviour which are valid according to the system's ultimate criteria of validity must be generally obeyed, and its rule of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public standards of officials behaviour by its official's."   

As already pointed out, Hart rejects Austin's concept of rules as commands, and the notion that rules are phenomena that consist merely in externally observable activities or habit. Instead, Hart asks us to consider the social dimension of rules, namely the manner in which members of a society perceive the rule in question, and their attitude towards it. As we have seen Hart gives us in depth guidance on how we can best understand the nature of law.

Finally yet importantly, Hans Kelsen also provides his own view on what legal positivism stands for via his 'pure theory of law'. Some have argued that Kelsen's theory of law is complicated to understand hence why it has not been so influential.   In essence, his pure theory of law wants to define legal systems as 'oughts' or norms.   This does not seem ambiguous at first but Kelsen complicates the theory himself by acknowledging that law is not only made up by norms, but it is made up of legal norms and legal acts as determined by these norms.   As a result, although Kelsen's work may be important, it has not been close to as influential as Hart's work. This is evident in the fact that Kelsen's pure theory of law is not usually covered in many debates in contemporary legal positivism,   and thus only a brief summary of his theory is given here. Having looked at a brief account of the main ideas behind legal positivism, we can move on to see where Tamanaha went wrong in interpreting Hart's work.

When analysing the separation thesis, Tamanaha refers to a Hart article titled 'Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals'.   One has to worry whether Tamanaha has taken this title for its literal meaning rather than scrutinising the key ideas within the article. Tamanaha argues that a number of things have happened to the separation thesis, which has weakened its position within legal positivism:

"The transformation of the separation thesis into an abstraction was completed with a vengeance in the latest version promoted by inclusive legal positivists, which reads: 'Separability Thesis: There is some possible legal system where the legality of a norm does not depend on any of its moral properties.' The separation thesis-with the telling new label 'separability' thesis-now asserts that 'there exists a conceptually possible legal system in which the legal validity of a norm does not depend on its moral merits.' No longer about actually existing legal systems, the separability thesis is a purely abstract proposition about the nature of a legal system."   Tamanaha adds that:

"the semantic thrust of the separation thesis is reversed, from a warning that we should not assume law is moral just because it is law, to a confirmation that law and morality are usually not separate, holding out from conceding the complete merger of the two by insisting only that it is possible to abstractly conceive of a legal system in which this combination does not hold."   

Tamanaha seems to place a great deal of weight on Hart's work yet he overlooks the fact that it was Hart who in the Concept of Law, transformed ideas about legal positivism. Some of the key ideas behind traditional legal positivism lead by Bentham and Austin were developed to meet the needs of society at that particular time. This is evident in the fact that Hart was able to dismiss many of their ideas simply because we could not apply them in a modern society and there were better methods to understand the nature of law. Moreover, it is doubtful whether any legal positivist today would claim that they will not adapt new ideas or even new theories if they saw them as practicable and appropriate. Therefore, it seems that the simple explanation as to why there has been a split in the camp of legal positivism is that in order to be able to apply legal positivism in contemporary times, theorists have tried to embrace the merger of law and morality:

"Soft [inclusive] positivists interpret the Separation Thesis as involving only a modal, existential generalization of the following form: it is (conceptually) possible that there exists at least one rule of recognition, and thus one legal system, in which morality is not a criterion of legal validity. Hard [exclusive] positivists, by contrast, interpret the Separation Thesis as requiring a universal generalization of the form: for all rules of recognition, hence for all legal systems, it is not the case that morality is a criterion of legality, unless some content- neutral criterion makes it so."   

It seems then that because legal positivism has been able to adapt it has done the opposite of what Tamanaha claims, as it is still relevant in contemporary times. Nonetheless, Tamanaha then moves on to provide an alternative thesis, which would make legal positivism relevant again. His alternative is that:

"The Separation Thesis: what law is and what law ought to be are separate matters, regardless of actual or possible connections of law and morality. This is a cautionary reminder that law can be bad even when it claims to be good. It applies to all manifestations of law no matter what their purported relationship with morality, including those which expressly derive from, refer to, require decisions about, or incorporate moral norms…"   

First of all, why should we make it harder for ourselves to understand the nature of law by applying such a strict criteria to the separation thesis. If we are able to question different aspects of the nature of law, then surely that will gives us a better opportunity to understand it. In addition, if we are to follow Tamanaha's proposal, it would put an end to any research into the possibility of a link between law and morality, and there is a lot of research, which suggests that there are some important links which we should not overlook. Tamanaha gives us a one sided story which does not carry out a full investigation as to why we should completely rule out any link between law and morality. Nonetheless, Tamanaha is adamant that if we do this we will "turn away from the abstract orientation of inclusive and exclusive accounts and return in spirit to the traditional thrust of legal positivism, making it directly relevant to the contemporary situation."   

Tamanaha's work has double standards as he relies on Hart's work to argue in favour of the separation thesis but suggests here that we should disregard inclusive legal positivism altogether in favour of his 'superior alternative'. Hart made it clear in the Concept of Law that he preferred inclusive positivism to exclusive positivism, as it was a better expression of his aims and objectives.   So mistakenly, Tamanaha presupposes that Hart was of the same opinion as him, but had he carefully read Hart's work, he would have understood that this was not the case. Tamanaha states that "At the very outset he [Hart] presented legal positivism as 'the history of an idea', which is: 'the need to distinguish, firmly and with the maximum of clarity, law as it is from law as it ought to be."   However, as we will discover from our investigation below this is certainly not the case as Hart's work has clearly been misinterpreted.

For Tamanaha, recognising the separation thesis as the core of legal positivism will enable us to identify which laws are immoral. Hart has stated that "Both thinkers' [Bentham and Austin] prime reason for this insistence [on recognizing the separation between law and morality] was to enable men to see steadily the precise issues posed by the existence of morally bad laws."   However, one point, which is never considered by Tamanaha, is whether Hart himself was wrong in this interpretation, could it be possible that what Bentham and Austin wanted is not what has been portrayed by Hart. Hart's book The Concept of Law has received so much attention that hundreds if not thousands of papers have been published by many who simply take his word for it. One of the reasons why his work has been one of the most important within legal philosophy is that theorists are apprehensive about questioning his work (presumably worried that they might suffer the same fate as Dworkin). It seems that Tamanaha has been overwhelmed by Hart's work, as he seems to value his work tremendously:

"Another factor is the dominance in the field of H L A Hart, in particular of his extraordinary book The Concept of Law (1961). It overstates matters to assert that legal positivist works today are mere footnotes to Hart's canonical text, but there is no question that he established the parameters of the current understanding of legal positivism. Legal positivism today remains trapped within Hart's paradigm, consigned to working out its implications, whether by way of refinement, partial repudiation, clarification or extension. Hart's lengthy intellectual dominance, continuing through two generations of scholars with no sign of diminishment, should not be interpreted in negative terms."   

One cannot help but get the impression that Tamanaha believes that if he keeps quoting Hart as and authority throughout his article it will make his work more credible. Hart has admitted within his work that his concept of law is not the final say as he realises that there will come a time when it may not be relevant or beneficial to rely on his ideas.   Moreover, we can dismiss Tamanaha's arguments in a number of other ways. Firstly, the separation thesis was not something that had been endorsed in early legal positivism, so inevitably through Hart's misinterpretation Tamanaha has fully endorsing the separation thesis by dedicating most of his article on this point. Others have also disputed the separation thesis, Green adds that; "That thesis, however, is false."   Green sheds light on the fact that Hart did not intend for readers to believe that law and morality should be "kept separate" or that law and morality are in fact "separated".   Fuller is a prime example of someone who had been mistaken in thinking that Hart intended that "law must be strictly severed from morality".   Similar to Fuller, Tamanaha seems to be of the strong opinion that law and morality must be kept separate at all costs. This belief may arise from Austin's work who has stated that:

"The existence of law is one thing: its merit or demerit is another. Whether it be or not be is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard is a different enquiry. A law, which actually exists, is a law, though we happen to dislike it, or though it vary from the text, by which we regulate our approbation and disapprobation."   

It is in no doubt that Bentham and Austin laid the foundations for modern legal positivism. However, as Hart clearly demonstrated some of their ideas have proved to be impractical. Some have suggested that the thesis is "hopelessly ambiguous" and that the debates on the separation thesis have been "entirely pointless."   Green however argues that the separability thesis is "not ambiguous, nor absurd, nor obvious. On the contrary it is clear, coherent, and false,"   which is in stark contrast to the position Tamanaha has taken in his article.

According to Green, "Hart's methodological neutrality is no more than the claim that general jurisprudence must not arrive precommitted to conclusions about the moral value of law. This neutrality does not prompt or preclude any conclusions, nor does it presume any other kind of value-neutrality."   In other words, considering the nature of law from a neutral point of view does not prohibit research into possible and necessary connections between law and morality. And of course, if we were to discover such connections it will not automatically mean that it is morally good or bad that those connections exist. In addition, Hart only suggested that it would be more beneficial to understand the nature of law if we look at it from a neutral point of view.   Yet, it was Hart himself who later believed; "There are many different types of relation between law and morals and there is nothing which can be profitably singled out for study as the relation between them."   So the question is why should we take Hart's word without examining these connections, in order to decide for ourselves whether they are necessary? It seems that one too many writers in legal philosophy including Tamanaha, have blindly chosen to take Hart's word on everything he has said without once enquiring into his arguments.

Any argument that is put up in front of Hart about the connections between morality and law, is answered by simply saying "it ain't necessarily so."   In addition to this Hart has claimed, "It is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality."   Plausible as this reply may be (or not as I believe) it is not really a solution to the question, it is merely armchair conceptual analysis. To make it clear where Tamanaha is going wrong in his arguments we must understand what the separation thesis is really about. It seems then that the half-century debates within legal positivism have been about disputing that there are necessary connections between law and morality.   What is interesting is that according to Green "The separability thesis allows for any sort of contingent connection between law and morals. But what, precisely, is the difference?"   Hart himself does not deny that there is some sort of contingent connection between law and morality,   as he states that: "there is no important necessary or conceptual connection between law and morality."   This shows that he is aware that there may be necessary or conceptual connections but side steps fully accepting it by saying there are no important connections. Considering that Hart is regarded as one of the leading contemporary legal positivists, you would expect a much more in-depth explanation as to why none of these contingent links are important. Tamanaha has failed to bring up these sorts of arguments or question any of Hart's work in order to establish whether he was right. In addition, Green has strongly disputed what Hart suggested, as he believes that upon closer inspection we will discover that:

"Necessary and contingent are not contradictories. From the denial that there are necessary moral tests for the existence of law, it does not follow that there are contingent moral tests. There may be none at all. Thus, the separability thesis lends no support to Hart's view that as a contingent matter, in some legal systems, the existence of law does depend on its satisfying moral tests."   

As a result it seems that it is not possible to have contingent links if there are no necessary links. Hart could have made things easier by talking about connections which may be significant or insignificant but that would have meant admitting that there are connections between law and morality and ultimately that the separation thesis is false. As a result, Hart does not deny that there may be connections but neither does he accept that there may be necessary connections. One can only assume that Hart chose this neutral position as support to either side would draw vast amounts of criticism from other legal philosophers. In essence, it is clear that even Hart's analysis of the issues could be interrogated as he has avoided getting involved in this discussion. We will now move on to discuss some of the links and argue that these are in fact important connections that demonstrate that the separation thesis has been fabricated by Hart and misunderstood by many.

Green argues that there are derivative connections between law and morality. He observes that:

"Legal systems make moral norms determinate; they supply both information and motivation that help make those norms effective; they support valuable forms of social cooperation. Human nature being what it is, it is overwhelmingly likely that some good will come of all this, if only as a matter of natural necessity."   

In short, what is being proposed here is that certain laws establish a moral duty to obey them. Fuller strongly opposed this position as he believed that, "law must be strictly severed from morality." According to Fuller, it is impossible to have "an amoral datum called law, which has the peculiar quality of creating a moral obligation."   To a certain extent Fuller is right, if law was to be judged from a neutral point of view, we cannot at the same time claim that it creates moral obligations to obey it. However, such a position could only be imagined if it could be proved that there are absolutely no connections between law and morality, only then would we be able to say that we are looking at law from a neutral point of view. Anyhow, there is no moral duty to obey the law if law and morality are kept completely separate which is something that Fuller does not appreciate.

More importantly, it seems that Hart was also aware of these sort of arguments as he concludes that there are "two reasons (or excuses) for talking of a certain overlap between legal and moral standards as necessary and natural."   Hart talks about the "minimum content" thesis and "formal-justice." According to Hart, it is difficult to identify a legal system by looking at its structure alone, we must look at the content of law and how it works to promote the 'survival of its subjects'. Hart then explains that in most jurisdictions there is some form of administrative justice.   Hart stops short of admitting that there are necessary connections between law and morality when he concludes, "[T]hough the most odious laws may be justly applied, we have, in the bare notion of applying a general rule of law, the germ at least of justice."   This then suggests that Hart was on the verge of admitting that the separation thesis does not actually exist. Yet, Tamanaha has not questioned these statements by Hart, which is surprising to say the least as his failure to investigate Hart's work has led to his arguments being completely wrong. Additionally, if it is the case that the separation thesis is false it would be impossible for Tamanaha's alternative to work as his ideas primarily focus on emphasising the importance of the separation thesis.

Having discovered that the separability thesis does not deny that there is a derivative connection between law and morality, we will consider some direct connections between law and morality. Green states that the first connection is that "Necessarily, law regulates objects of morality."   What this suggests is that law and morality are interlinked as many laws that are created will be in place to meets the objects of morality. Laws are sometimes enacted to regulate matters which society believes to be important (for example up until recently gay couples were not allowed to be married as society felt that it interfered with the traditional institution of marriage advocated by the church- a form of religious purity). This does not mean that every legal system has moral merit, but it shows that there is "necessary relations between the scope of law and morality."   

Green adds that "Necessarily, law makes moral claims of its subjects."   This means that law does not simply guide us as to what we should do, but in effect, it gives us obligations as to how we should act, for either personal or public interest. In reality, most western legal systems have norms which impose obligations on its citizens, and if these obligations are not carried out the legal system claims legitimate authority to impose sanctions.   Green notices that by doing this the law is in a sense treating its subjects as being morally bound to obey it,   as trivial as this connection may seem, it clearly demonstrates that there is a connection between law and morality. Hart himself denied such a connection between law and morality when he stated that: "[I]t seems to me to be unrealistic to suppose that judges... must always either believe or pretend to believe in the false theory that there is always a moral obligation to conform to the law."   It is unclear as to why Hart would make such a statement but one can only assume that if he were to accept such an argument it would question the existence of the separation thesis.

The next argument Green makes is that "Necessarily, law is justice-apt."   By this he means that law is open to criticism and investigation into whether it is justifiable or whether there is a need for reform. It does not follow that all laws are justice-apt, but the fact that we can praise or criticise law in order to achieve justice that there is an important and necessary connection between law and morality.   Again, Tamanaha's arguments fall short of any such analysis, which illustrates that he has taken Hart's word in all of his work, rather than examine it in a proper manner.

The final point maintained by Green is that there is also another important negative connection between law and morality, namely that "Necessarily, law is morally risky."   What Green is getting at here is that we should not always think of law as having this overarching character, which aims to achieve good. Hart himself advocated this sort of ideology by saying that as society undergoes transformation and population rises it will be harder to maintain legal order, thus, why he may believe that law holds the answer to fixing this problem.   Hart is suggesting that we can use law to achieve greater good in society. However, this is not always the case, as the law can also be used by officials to oppress our communities with certain laws that are claimed to be morally justified.   Nonetheless, the point is that that law can be 'morally risky', as a result, there is a necessary connection between law and morality but this is a different kind of connection relating to certain 'vices' of the law.   Other legal theorists have also casted doubt on the existence of the separation thesis.

Gardner has strongly declared that the separation thesis "is absurd and no legal philosopher of note has ever endorsed it as it stands."   The question that arises is how can a leading legal theory attract this much misunderstanding? The explanation can only be that Hart has misunderstood much of Bentham and Austin's work, particularly, Austin who stated that "the existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another."   Gardner makes the point that "After all, there is a necessary connection between law and morality if law and morality are necessarily alike in any way. And of course they are. If nothing else, they are necessarily alike in both necessarily comprising some valid norms."   This is very similar to the arguments proposed by Green and although this is not a substantial link, it still substantiates that there are links between law and morality. In a recent paper, Gardner has argued that law and morality are connected as even when law is portrayed as being bad it still makes moral claims about being justified.   He argues that:

"Whole legal systems may, indeed, be run by cartels of self-serving officials for whom the system is primarily an elaborate extortion racket or a huge joke. Here law has no moral aims. Yet all legal officials, even in such a system, must at least pretend to have moral aims when they act in their official capacities."   

Raz also backs up this view, as he believes that officials will make moral claims on behalf of law.   Moreover, Gardner adds that: "Law makes moral claims, and when it makes those claims sincerely it has moral aims, and when it succeeds

In legal positivism, the assertion that law and morality are separate and distinct, and that legal validity is not dependent on or necessarily constrained by morality. Hart and Coleman take ...

To be successful, you must accept all challenges that come your way. You can't just accept the ones you like. Mike Gafka

Previous: Website project proposal sample document
Next post: Dissertation fu berlin online shopping